Ballot secrecy is a cornerstone of electoral democracy, since its real or perceived absence can make voters reluctant to express their true political preferences at the ballot box. While much work has been done on how traceable ballots interact with voter intimidation or vote buying, less is known about how the perceived absence of secret ballots affects voter behavior in contexts without voter intimidation and vote buying. Ballots in the stable city-state of Singapore, which has neither overt voter intimidation nor vote buying, contain a pre-assigned unique and non-transferable ID number. While there is no evidence that votes are traced, the ID number has led to the myth that they are, and that voting for the opposition can have negative consequences at the individual level. This paper uses two measurement approaches to formally estimate (i) how widespread the belief in vote tracing is; and (ii) how this belief affects voting behavior. We find that between 30% and 50% of the electorate believes that authorities trace individual votes in some manner, and that even by conservative estimate, around 8% of the electorate likely changed its voting behavior because of the belief. We show that this magnitude is sufficient to impact electoral outcomes.
Introduction
The secret ballot is a cornerstone of well-functioning liberal democracies. Without it, voters may be reluctant to voice their true political preferences at the ballot box, particularly in contexts where fear of reprisals for supporting the 'wrong' party is present.
Given this, the secret ballot is a formal feature of nearly all electoral democracies. Yet its formal presence does not preclude doubts about ballot secrecy among the electorate.
Indeed, the perception that votes are traced may be sufficient to change electoral behavior (Collier and Vicente (2012) ), even when they are not.
Much of the previous work on ballot secrecy has been done in the context of overt voter intimidation or vote buying strategies, where the reality and/or perception of vote traceability is necessary for the strategies to effectively target voters. This work has generally focused on the strategies adopted by candidates, in particular on understanding who candidates target and which means are used to sway their votes (Chaturvedi (2005) , Bhasin and Gandhi (2013) , or Mares and Young (2016) for a review of the literature).
Given the centrality of voter intimidation and vote buying to these studies, they have generally been situated in political systems that share three broad characteristics: (i) electoral violence is relatively widespread, well documented, and well known to voters even if they are not personally affected; (ii) punishments are carried out by private actors and usually take place outside the formal/legal institutions; and (iii) repression is quite severe, often taking the form of physical violence, privation of liberty, or property expropriation.
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This study enters new territory in that it examines how the perception of vote traceability affects voter behavior in a context (i) where there is no electoral violence; (ii) where coercion is generally perceived to be confined to legally established state institutions; and (iii) where punishments are perceived to be "soft", for example in the form of restricted access to public goods or career deceleration for civil servants. As dramatic interventions become more costly in the presence of ubiquitous social media penetration, "soft" punishments (whether actual or perceived) increase in importance as mechanisms through which to subtly manipulate electoral competition. To the best of our knowledge, Gerber et al. (2012) is the only other comprehensive study to analyze how the perceived lack of ballot secrecy affects voting behavior in a context free of electoral violence (the United States).They find only narrow effects: union members who believe that votes are not secret tend to change their vote out of fear of social stigma. Two non-peer review survey reports examine the issue of ballot secrecy in Singapore, but they do not address voting behavior (Koh (2015) ; Maruah (2013) ).
We use an original data set from Singapore based on a survey administered by our team between September 2016 and May 2017. Singapore is an economically developed country with negligible presence of ethnic, political, or social violence. It has held regular elections since the 1950s. The People's Action Party (henceforth PAP) has governed the country since full independence in 1965, winning at least 90% of seats in all general elections. Despite the presence of pre-election day manipulations like gerrymandering and asymmetric access to resources that serve to bias electoral competition in favor of the PAP (Tan (2013) ), there is no history of blunt interventions like physical intimidation and overt vote buying, and there are no election day or post election day malpractices like fraud, ballot stuffing, or vote miscounting.
All ballots in Singapore have a unique and non-transferable ID number printed on them. The practice stretches back to 1947 under the British colonial administration and is defended as necessary to prevent ballot stuffing and other forms of fraud. While the ID numbers make it technically possible to trace votes at the individual level, the Singapore government has long maintained that it does not do this. This position is also held by opposition parties, who likewise state the ballots are secret. Following a recent parliamentary debate, for example, prominent opposition MP Leon Perera wrote on his Facebook page "Our votes in elections are secret and can never be traced -no ifs, no buts."
2 Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that votes are traced and we contend that it is a safe assumption to state they are not.
The presence of ID numbers on ballots, however, has long engendered rumors that the government does trace votes. Moreover, the rumors hold that those who vote for the opposition may be subject to some form of penalty, albeit non-violent. Variants of this penalty include lower priority in accessing public housing or public schools for children, difficulties in accessing pension funds, or constrained opportunities for those working as civil servants. These are powerful (perceived) threats in a small city-state where over 80%
of the population lives in public housing, all children attend public schooling, all males without exception are conscripted into national service for two years, and all citizens automatically contribute to a state-run pension plan. In short, in an environment where citizens perceive a personal vulnerability vis-a-vis the state, even unsubstantiated doubts over the secrecy of the ballot can be psychologically powerful. When present, uncommitted voters may feel a nudge to support the government, just in case there are personal consequences for supporting the government. If sufficiently widespread, this phenomenon may be an understudied contributor to the resilience of dominant parties.
The goal of this paper is to measure (i) how widespread the belief that individual votes are traced is, and (ii) how substantially -if at all -this belief affects the voting behavior of individuals in Singapore. Given the sensitive and complex nature of this issue, we use two distinct measurement approaches to establish upper and lower bounds.
We estimate the upper bound through a list experiment, which we embed in a household survey. We are confident that this upper bound is robust to social desirability bias, though it may overestimate effect size by capturing beliefs and behaviors beyond those we focus on. The lower bound is established through direct questioning which, as opposed to a list experiment, gives us room for several and more nuanced questions, and dramatically reduces noise in the answers. The obvious downside is that it may be subject to social desirability bias. These two measures allow us to estimate upper and lower bounds for percentage of respondents that believe the vote tracing rumor and again for the percentage that alter their preferred vote because of it. To illustrate the potential practical impact of this, we produce a counter-factual election that predicts consequences for parliamentary representation. Finally, following Blair and Imai (2012) , we characterize the set of voters who are most vulnerable to changing their votes because of concerns around vote secrecy.
We estimate that between between 34% and 52% of voters in Singapore have doubts about the secrecy of ballots. This compares to roughly 20% in the United States (Gerber et al. (2012) ) and 37% in Argentina (Stokes (2012) ). Furthermore, between 8% and 25% of respondents report having voted differently from their preference due to concerns over vote tracing. This figure needs to be interpreted with some caution. It is possible that some percentage of respondents conflate collective punishments (less public goods to a district that votes opposition, which does not require individual vote tracing) with individual punishments (targeted consequences for individual voters that support the opposition). This conflation is supported by direct questioning: 17% of respondents believe that individuals may be subject to penalties when they vote against the government.
However, when asked about what specific kind of penalties, one in five list collective punishments among the examples. In addition, it is an unrealistic assumption that all who currently vote for the government due to fear of penalties would switch their votes to the opposition in an environment of total vote secrecy: some portion of opposition supporters prefer more opposition presence in parliament but not a turnover in government (Chan (2015 ), or Xu (2015 ), and thus may not vote for the opposition if it had a realistic chance of securing power.
Still, even a relatively small effect size has the potential to significantly alter Singapore's political dynamic. A swing of just 5% in the 2011 general election, for example, would have been sufficient for the PAP to lose its legislative supermajority for the first time in the country's history, assuming the swing was present across all districts. In other words, lingering doubts about ballot secrecy in Singapore (or in other stable electoral democracies) have the potential to subtly alter election outcomes and so should be considered among the menu of manipulations for swaying electoral competition (Schedler (2002) ).
This paper makes two main contributions. First, it provides insights into how even the perceived threat of "soft" penalties can alter voting behavior in contexts free of blunt interventions and repressions. This matters, because it provides a mechanism -whether knowingly or unknowingly implemented -for dominant parties to nudge voters towards preferred outcomes without engaging in any actions that could be subject to domestic or international condemnations. Indeed, all that is required for fear to deliver some quantity of bonus votes is an absence of action to convince the electorate that secrecy is indeed guaranteed. It is hard to imagine a lower-cost mechanism through which to nudge electoral outcomes.
Second, the methodological approach used allows us to distinguish between the proportion of voters that are skeptical about vote secrecy and those that change their vote as a result of it. To our knowledge, this has not been explicitly documented before. We are also able to make inferences about the distribution of doubts on vote secrecy. Interestingly, we find roughly comparable levels across ethnic, social, and age groups in the Singaporean electorate. The lack of age gap suggests that inter-generational transmission may play a particularly strong role in perpetuating the belief. Voters from opposition districts are no more or less likely to believe that votes are traced. Furthermore, civil servants, who would be most vulnerable to punishment for 'wrong' votes, are less likely than average to both believe votes are tracked, and to change their intended vote. The dimension on which Singapore scores the lowest in The Economist's Democracy Index is "electoral process and pluralism". This stems from the pre-election manipulations that create an uneven playing field which advantages the PAP, including through gerrymandering (Tan (2013) ); asymmetric access to resources (Weiss et al (2016) ); influence over the media (Lee (2010) ); deep penetration into state appendages (Slater (2012) ); and occasional targeted usage of libel laws (Gomez (2006) ). The historical weakness of opposition candidates (Mutalib (2003) ) combined with Singapore's strong development record grants the PAP "performance legitimacy" (Chua (1995) ) and leads voters to assess candidates primarily based on credibility rather than ideology or policy positions, making it difficult for opposition candidates to effectively appeal to voters (Oliver and Ostwald (2017) .
On and after election day, however, Singapore's elections can be regarded as abiding by high standards: there is no record of vote fraud, ballot stuffing, preventive disenfranchisement, threats to voters, ballot rigging, altered results after a re-count, excessive queuing, or any other type of malpractice that typically takes place during or after election day. 5 Most recently, this has led to the US Department of State deeming the 2015 4 https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf, last accessed on April 17, 2017.
5 Note, however, one interesting practice: Polls are staffed by a neutral polling officer, but each contesting party is allowed to designate one member act as a monitor. That monitor is able to purchase a list of the registered voters for the given district, as an additional check to ensure that only eligible voters cast votes. As this list is expensive, it frequently occurs that only the PAP monitor has access to it. The general election as "free, fair, and open to a viable opposition" (US Department Of State (2015)).
Government penetration into the social and economic sphere
Singapore is a small island that stretches approximately 30 miles from west to east and 15 miles from north to south, making it roughly twelve times the size of Manhattan Island in area. It contains a population of 5.6 million in a high density, fully urbanized environment. Singapore has a strong state that penetrates deeply into nearly all aspects of social and economic life. It maintains an extensive array of programs and interventions that affect the quotidian lives of all citizens. Arguably more than any other country in the world, Singapore's state is an omni-present feature of daily life.
This begins with the residential market: over 80% of Singaporeans live in public housing managed by the state Housing Development Board (HDB). This agency oversees and regulates the sale of all units, including resales. The purchasing process is initiated with an application to the state agency, which then makes a determination about which units a prospective buyer is eligible to buy, and where on the waiting list the buyer appears. This grants the state a central role in determining where the large majority of Singaporean reside.
Primary and secondary school attendance is mandatory; failure to comply is a criminal offence for parents. With few exceptions that require an appeal to the Ministry of Education (MOE), Singaporean children must attend the public school system, which is under the direct control of the Ministry of Education. Private schools in Singapore are generally reserved for international students or select religious groups, but even these are subject to advice and oversight from the ministry. Selection into top schools, which is seen as vital for career success, is competitive and is administered by the Ministry of Education. Interestingly, public education does not include kindergarten; most children that attend kindergarten go to one of the nearly 400 kindergartens that are run through the charitable arm of the PAP.
All male citizens and second generation permanent residents are conscripted into a mandatory national military service for a period of approximately two years. There is PAP monitor is often an active grassroots party member from that district and is also often involved in the Residential Association, which provides many of the community's social services. This means, ultimately, that a PAP monitor with strong influence in the community and access to voters' names is last interaction a voter has before entering the booth. While the monitor does not enter the booth with the voter and has no way of knowing the vote itself, the psychological effect of this may be substantial.
substantial variation in the perceived hardship and utility of the service, however, depending on the branch of the service and the vocation that conscripts are assigned. In addition, selection into the officer ranks is perceived as having very lucrative career implications.
Though some effort has been made recently to incorporate conscripts' preferences, the ultimate determination remains with the state institution.
The Central Provident Fund (CPF) is a mandatory state-administered savings fund into which employees and their employers contribute a percentage of wages. It usage is restricted towards housing, health care, or retirement. It is the primary reserve of savings for most Singaporeans. Access to the funds is carefully controlled by the CPF office.
Around 14% of Singapore's resident labor force is employed in the public sector.
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While this figure suggests a relatively lean state, a sizable proportion of the remaining labor force works in close proximity to the state or is otherwise dependent on the state for licensing or regulation. Civil society is especially subject to oversight: the state subjects all civil society groups to registration requirements and has nearly absolute discretion to dissolve groups.
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In aggregate, the myriad dimensions on which Singaporean citizens are reliant upon the state create for some citizens the sense of a high-stakes environment in which antagonizing the state could result in substantial, albeit non-violent, consequences. This fear is amplified by the omnipresent (and state sanctioned) "survival narrative", which makes frequent reference to the Singapore's tense past, including threats from larger neighboring countries and domestic instability (Barr and Skrbis (2008) ), as well as the generally antagonistic stance the PAP has had against political opposition in the country. In Singapore's tumultuous early history, this included the arrest and detention of leftist elements in pivotal events like the 1963 Operation Coldstore ((Ramakrishna (2015) ; more recently it has included occasional lawsuits targeting opposition figureheads or collective punishments -for example, reduced priority for upgrades to public housing blocks -meted out to districts that select opposition parties.
Ballots, Serial Numbers, and Vote Tracing
All paper ballots in Singapore contain a serial number printed on the ballot and on a matching counterfoil. Upon appearing at a polling station, voters are given their unique and non-transferable ballot, which is separated from the counterfoil. Voters inscribe an 'X' next to the party they support and drop the ballot into a ballot box, while the residing electoral officer retains the matching counterfoil.
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The rationale for this system is to prevent electoral fraud, including counterfeiting, stuffing of ballot papers in the ballot box, or impersonation.
9 A number of other countries We use a probability proportional to size sampling strategy to produce a representative sample of public housing residents. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the survey as a whole, and for each of the controls/treatments in our experiment. Since our sample includes public housing residents only, we compare our statistics to the descriptive statistics for the resident population in public housing.
13 These suggest that all our subsamples are remarkably representative of public housing residents. Response rate was 26% of households contacted.
Empirical strategy
Our primary interest is to measure the proportion of voters (i) that believe the Singaporean government tracks individual votes, and (ii) that voted differently from their preference due to that fear. We recognize two conflicting challenges to this. The first is that the beliefs and behaviors we are interested in are specific and can be easily conflated with related beliefs and behaviors, most notably a belief in collective punishment at the district level for supporting the opposition. This does occur since the 1997 general election (opposition districts receive fewer "goodies" than PAP districts), but this does not require vote tracing at the individual level. 13 Singapore public housing statistics are taken from HDB (2014), which is issued by the public housing state agency (Housing and Development Board) .
14 Just before the 1997 general election, the government announced that it would give priority to the upgrading of public housing apartments to residents who voted for the PAP. Indeed, it also announced collective penalties, there is a risk of overestimating effect size. An obvious solution is to explicitly specify the phenomena we are interested in and distinguish it from related phenomena, but doing so raises the risk of the second challenge (social desirability bias): since voting and opposition support are often perceived as sensitive issues in Singapore, asking questions in a direct and explicit manner may lead some respondents to provide socially desirable (i.e., perceived safe) responses, rather than true sentiments. There is evidence to support this: the only time that the Singapore's Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) asked about voting intentions, around 50% of the respondents refused to answer (presidential elections of 2011).
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We address these conflicting challenges through two distinct measurement approaches.
The first asks direct and explicit questions on vote beliefs, thereby reducing the risk of capturing related phenomena but being vulnerable to social desirability bias. As there is no clear risk of over-estimating effect size, this approach establishes the lower bounds.
The second approach relies on a list experiment (also known as item count technique), which is less sensitive to social desirability bias, but may be vulnerable to capturing related phenomena. As this reduces the risk of under-estimating effect size, this measure establishes the upper bound. Respondents received a survey with either the direct questions or the list experiment, but not both. As list experiments require a larger number of respondents to accurately estimate effect sizes, most respondents receive a version of the survey with the list experiment.
Direct Questions
The direct questions are designed to explicitly cue on issues around ballot secrecy to effectively disaggregated them from related issues. They begin with the following statement: This is followed by three questions.
• Q1: Do you think that the vote in Singapore is secret, or do you think that the government keeps track of who each voter votes for in elections?
Individual votes are secret Individual votes are tracked
• Q2: Do you think that individuals that vote for the opposition sometimes get penalized by the government?
Yes No
• Q3: Did you ever plan to vote for the opposition but in the end decided not to because you were afraid that the government would penalize you or your family?
In a separate text box, we ask respondents that say 'Yes' to Q2 to provide examples of the kind of penalties that voters who support the opposition are subject to.
List Experiments
A typical list experiment works as follows: two representative samples are draw from the population of interest. One is used as a control group, the other one as treatment.
Respondents in the control group are presented with the following question: "Now we are going to show you a list of statements. Could you tell us how many statements do you agree with? Please do not tick individual statements, just tell us the total number" [in bold in the survey]. There are N statements. Respondents in the treatment group are given the same instructions, but their list has the original N statements and an additional sensitive item, for a total of N + 1 total statements. This way, unless respondents indicate the totality of N + 1 statements to be true, they can feel assured that their beliefs with regard to the sensitive statement are not disclosed. The difference in means π for both groups can then be interpreted as the proportion of the population for which the sensitive statement is true.
In our case, we use the following four statements for the control group:
• I like durian very much.
• I have had a haircut within the last four days.
• I have eaten at a hawker centre at least once in the last two days.
• I have gone to a local "Meet the People" session at least once in the last year.
The sensitive item included in the treatment group is the following:
• Treatment 1: I changed my intended vote at the last general election because I think authorities track individual votes.
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In the Singaporean context, the sensitive statement is widely understood as wanting to vote for the opposition but ultimately voting for the incumbent party (PAP). Our chosen wording is intended to emphasize that vote tracking was a critical determinant of switching the intended vote from opposition to incumbent.
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The justification for the four control statements is as follows: First, the list experiment is embedded into a survey that asks about daily life, social trust, and community relations. The statements are designed to fit seamlessly into this context. Second, they are uncorrelated: agreement to one statement cannot predict agreement to any of the other ones. Third, anyone could easily agree or disagree to any of these statements regardless of age, social class or ethnic group. 18 Fourth, one of the statements, although possible for anyone, is highly unlikely ('I have had a haircut within the last four days'): this is included to prevent 'ceiling effects', which may induce some respondents to leave off one statement if they in fact agree to all. Finally, the survey also contains questions on political knowledge, political attitudes, and trust of institutions and other citizens. Hence, the sensitive statement likewise does not appear out of context for respondents.
In order to better pin-point trust on ballot secrecy and voting behavior, we also include two alternative treatments:
• Treatment 2: I or someone very close to me changed their intended vote at the last general election because I/s(he) think(s) authorities track individual votes.
19
• Treatment 3: I think that in this country authorities track individual votes at general elections.
16 For this treatment, we use four slightly different specifications. Since we find no differences across them, we group them in the results. A more detailed analysis by type of treatment can be found in the Supplementary Materials. The treatments vary across two dimensions: "at the last general election" versus "at a general election", and "because I think authorities track individual votes" versus "because of the personal consequences I would face." Most of the respondents (492, i.e., 56.3% of those in Treatment 1) were shown the treatment as specified above.
17 In the Appendix, we present results from a sample of respondents for whom we used an alternative statement without any explicit mention to vote switching. Results do not change.
18 Durian is a local fruit that has a powerful taste for which there are rarely in-between preferences: either it is loved or highly disliked. A 'hawker center' is a local market where one can find dozens of stalls that serve inexpensive local food. They are extremely popular and frequented by people from all ages, social classes, and ethnic groups. An equivalent statement in the US would be "I have visited a coffee shop or a grocery shop at least one in the last two days."
19 Treatment 2 has the same variations as Treatment 1. See footnote 16.
Finally, for a fifth group of respondents, we introduce a statement that we call 'placebo statement':
• 
Results
We begin with results from the direct questioning, which are intended to establish the lower bounds for belief in vote tracing and voting contrary to preferences due to fear of targeted individual-level penalties. The first column of Table 2 reports the percentage of respondents that answer 'yes' to belief that votes are traced; 'yes' to the belief that the government punishes individuals that vote for the opposition; and 'yes' to having voted contrary to preferences in the past because of fear that the vote is traced. The second column reports the percentage item non-response for each question.
Results show that roughly one in three voters believe that the ballot is not secret.
Approximately half of those (18% of respondents) believe that opposition voters are sometimes penalized. 8% of respondents admit to having voted against their preferences because they fear individual-level reprisals from the government.
Respondents that believe the government penalizes individual voters for supporting the opposition are asked to provide examples of penalties. As anticipated, most of the responses indicate perceived disadvantages in acquiring public housing; in career advancement; or in school placement for their children. Approximately 25%, however, specified collective punishments like delayed upgrading of housing blocks, which indicates that even with explicit questioning some respondents conflate collective punishments for a district that supports the opposition with individual-level punishments that result from vote tracing. We can assume that this inflates magnitudes by a comparable margin, in which case we would estimate the effects to be roughly 25%, 14%, and 6% respectively. The item non-response rates indicate the potential for social desirability bias, 20 which would have a countervailing influence. Ultimately, we are confident that these figures are a reasonable estimate of the lower bounds. Even if all statistical comparisons in the table are made with respect to the placebo group, we find that the mean for the treatments is significantly different from the control at either the 5% or 1% levels. Table 5 shows a more precise set of estimates of statistical significance for the differences in means. We compute the test of difference in means for all groups with respect to one another. The resulting p-values are reported in table 5. Two main takeaways emerge. First, the results are remarkably robust, given that all treatments are significantly different from their corresponding controls. Second, the mean for the 'skeptic' treatment is significantly larger the mean for vote switch treatment, which suggests that many people believe votes are tracked, but do not change their vote because of it (either because they vote for the government out of conviction, or because they do not worry about the potential consequences of voting for the opposition).
There is a clear distinction between results when the sensitive item is "I believe votes are tracked" and when it is "I changed my vote because I believe votes are tracked". It is also worth noting that even though the mean for the treatment "I or someone I know well changed the vote because..." is smaller than for the treatment "I changed my vote because...", this difference is not statistically significant (p-value > 0.6).
While the statements specify vote tracing and punishment at the individual -level, their wording is lean and no additional cues are available to focus attention. This mitigates the risk of social desirability bias, but places the burden on respondents to carefully differentiate between our intended individual-level focus and aggregate (i.e., district-level)
observed, factual penalties for supporting the opposition. Hence, it is likely that some respondents do conflate aggregate level and individual level tracing and punishment, which inflates effect size. 25% of respondents specified collective punishments as examples of targeted individual consequences. We assume the percentage to be at least as big in the list experiments, given the lean wording and absence of additional cues. Since we do not anticipate any social desirability bias with this measurement approach, however, these figures represent the absolute upper bound of estimates.
Taken together, the two measurement strategies suggest estimated bounds as follows:
between roughly 34% and 52% of the electorate have some doubt about the secrecy of the ballot; and between 8% and 25% have voted against their preferences out of fear of penalties. Two things are particularly notable about these estimates: first, their spread is substantial, particularly for changing vote. This illustrates clearly how dependent findings are on measurement strategy and formulation of questions, as we see both approaches as appropriate for the context and well executed. Second, the effect sizes are substantial, even for the direct questioning. While they are credible in light of roughly comparable findings from the United States and Argentina -where doubts about ballot secrecy were estimated at 20% and 37% respectively (Gerber et al. (2012) ; Stokes (2012)) -they are substantially larger than a previous estimate in Singapore (Koh (2015) ). The true effect size likely lies at the lower end of our spectrum near the estimates from the direct questioning, as these are most plausible in light of existing knowledge on party support in Singapore.
Robustness Checks
We conduct two robustness checks in order to provide insights on general response quality.
We first limit the analysis to two sub-samples of respondents that did not have the right to vote in any of the past elections: Singaporeans under the age of 23 and non-citizens.
For these sub-samples, we would expect higher means for treatment groups that receive statements for which personally voting is not required (treatment 2: "I or someone I know well changed their intended vote..."; and treatment 3: "I think that in this country authorities track individual votes at general elections"), but not for the statement that does require personal voting (treatment 1: "I changed the intended vote..."). Table 7 reports the results for non-Singaporeans. It clearly suggests that respondents did indicate as false the statement about dinner with the Prime Minister, as well as treatment 1 about changing their own vote. The means for treatments 2 and 3 that do not require personally voting, however, are indeed larger. This means that residents who could not vote in the last election may still know someone who has changed his/her vote because of fear, and may indeed believe that authorities track votes in Singapore.
We can apply the same interpretation for the sub-group of Singaporean respondents aged 18-24, most of whom were ineligible to vote during the last election (legal voting age in Singapore is 21). Table 8 shows these results: these respondents do not claim to have changed their own vote, but in fact more than one third of them seem to know someone that has. A similar proportion of youngsters seem to personally believe that votes are tracked. In tandem, these findings suggest that respondents are indeed responding to the list experiment as intended, even if there is some potential confusion on individual and collective level vote tracing.
Counterfactual
What are the practical implications of these findings? While the PAP has consistently held a legislative supermajority and has never lost more than 10% of seats, its margin of victory has been relatively narrow in numerous districts during the last two elections. We attempt to assess the practical implications of our findings by computing counterfactual election outcomes in the absence of concerns about ballot secrecy. Before presenting findings, several issues must be addressed.
First, we unfortunately do not have a sufficient number of observations per district to compute predicted effects at the district levels. This requires us to make the unrealistic assumption that the effect of removing all doubts about ballot secrecy would be uniform across districts. However, (i) we do not find a significant difference in effect size between districts that are currently held by the opposition and those that are held by the PAP;
and (ii) the mean for the treatment group is larger than for the control group in 22 out of the 24 electoral districts in our dataset (and in one of these two, the mean is the same).
These mitigate concerns about the assumption being too strong.
Furthemore, the PAP's dominance of Singapore's politics is such that the most prominent opposition party -the Worker's Party -has publicly stated that it does not currently seek to displace the PAP, but rather to build stronger checks against the PAP in parliament (Abdullah (2012) ). This similar view resonates with some indeterminate proportion of opposition supporters as well, who hold a preference for more balance in parliament, but not for an opposition government. This means that they vote for the opposition only until a turnover in power becomes a clear possibility, at which point they switch their vote to the PAP. A headline in one of the most prominent local political blogs summarized this feeling following the 2015 general election: "The failure of the opposition is its high possibility of success" (Xu (2015) ). Thus if it was widely assumed that an obviously secret ballot could lead to a turnover in power, some proportion of voters that state an opposition preference but have not voted opposition in the past due to fear of reprisals, would likely continue to vote for the PAP.
This makes it difficult to accurately predict the actual effect on election outcomes of introducing a ballot that totally eliminated concerns about individual-level vote tracing.
Hence, we present only very conservative scenarios by showing outcomes for vote swings of 3%; 5%; and 10% , which are not bigger and some times smaller than our most conservative estimate..
Predicted outcomes are displayed in Table 9 (2015 General Election) and Table 10 (2011 General Election). We show the actual seat distributions after both general elections, as well as the projected seat distributions after 3%, 5%, and 10% vote swings.
The impact of even the larger 10% vote swing would have only a marginal effect in the 2015 General Election. This should not be a surprise, given the exceptional nature of this election (the country celebrated its 50th anniversary as well as mourned the death of founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (see: Tan and Lee (2016) ), which led to the largest PAP margin of victory in decades. The 2011 election can be seen as a more likely indicator of elections to come. Here, the relatively small 3% and 5% swings have a minor effect and do not endanger the PAP's supermajority. A 10% vote swing, however, sees nearly 40% of seats move from the PAP to the opposition. This not only removes the legislative supermajority, but with 53% of seats, comes close to securing victory.
The lack of turnover does mean the moderate swings are potentially inconsequential.
In a single party dominant context like Singapore's, small incremental changes alter the political dynamic over the long-term. This is particularly the case if the opposition is able to establish itself more firmly in new districts, as control of town councils that deliver local goods can have spillover effects on expertise and political know-how for that party.
Clearly, a larger swing that removed the supermajority would mark a new chapter in Singapore's political history.
Discussion
We find strong evidence that skepticism around the secrecy of the ballot in Singapore is more prevalent than previous work has suggested: Maruah (2013) and Koh (2015) , for example, found that around 10-15% of the population believe that the vote in Singapore is not secret. By contrast, we estimate that skepticism is likely closer to one-third of all voters, though some of these may be conflating individual level vote tracing with tracing at the building level. Moreover, we find that a non-negligible portion of the electoratea conservative estimate would be 5-7% -did not vote for their preferred party in the past due to fears of targeted, individual-level penalties from the government.
Whether intentional or not, this dynamic provides an additional and meaningful boost to the dominant PAP party. We contend, then, that doubts around ballot secrecy should be considered among mechanisms that serve to skew competition towards the dominant party, even if the ballot is, in fact, secret, and the government does not intentionally cultivate the skepticism.
Why is skepticism around ballot secrecy so pronounced in Singapore, despite the absence of evidence for it and the insistence from both the government and the opposition that the vote is secret? It is useful to remember that even in the United States, where ballots do not have identifying numbers imprinted on them, a study found that roughly 20% of voters expressed doubts about the secrecy of their vote Gerber et al. (2012 Percentages are taken using the subsample of respondents who explicitly mention at least one type of penalty that opposition voters may receive. 
